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We stated at the outset that we had both political and intellectual 
objectives in producing this volume. Given the abuse of public opinion 
data in current policy debates, our aim was to provide responsible analysis 
of what can and cannot be said about the evolution of public opinion in the 
area of national security. The various profiles of national opinion have 
already given the reader considerable insight into the particular character-
istics of the seven countries we have chosen to examine. In this concluding 
chapter, we will attempt to link the data to some general notions about 
what has been happening to public attitudes over the past few years. 
What follows will focus mostly on the question of what has been 
happening, not why it may or may not have happened. And even what has 
or has not been happening is in some cases difficult to determine as will be 
seen. For continuity, we use the same basic categories that have provided 
the guidelines for the country profiles. The penultimate section then turns 
to the analytical questions that require most urgent attention in order to 
advance our ability to understand public attitudes in the area of national 
security policy, and the final section to the political implications that ßow 
from the current state of the art and from the information base we have 
developed. Throughout it must be borne in mind that we are attempting 
to make no judgements about the merits of specific policies or policy 
objectives but simply trying to explore the interface between the public 
and policy in this crucial area. 
lt should be repeated that the "reality" of public opinion on defense 
issues that emerges from the work in this book will comfort none of the 
protagonists in recent debates. As is most frequently the case, it lies 
somewhere between the exaggerated extremes that have been widely 
portrayed publicly. Thus, it is difficult to find evidence that the public at 
large has become a driving force in shaping the security policy alternatives 
available to decision makers, but it is equally difficult to argue that nothing 
of significance has happened in public perceptions in the national security 
area. The following pages attempt to put this into perspective. 
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The Public Record 
PERCEIVED SALIENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
We have chosen to separate the dimension of perceived salience from the 
four image clusters that follow because we consider it the key to our ability 
to evaluate the ultimate significance of the wealth of data summarized 
there. There are two basic reasons for this judgment. First, as mentioned 
in the introduction, we think that the dimension of salience, or the 
importance to the individual (as opposed to judgments on importance for 
the country), is a critical addition to the standard components of attitudes, 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral. To know how important a subject 
matter is for individuals can teil us a great deal about two key issues: (1) 
whether what appears as cognition is in fact merely produced by the 
affective content of the stimulus, and (2) whether apparent inconsistencies 
between different cognitions and different evaluations are the outgrowth 
of a particularly complex image of the world or rather the product of 
adjusting responses to whatever "feels best" at the moment, without any 
sensation of being contradictory. In the final analysis, the salience attrib-
uted to a subject matter by respondents is a good measure of the extent to 
which reliable and valid measurement of popular perceptions toward that 
subject matter is feasible. The closer issues are to people, therefore, the 
more likely their survey responses will reflect attitudes rather than being 
nonattitudes. 
Second, even though we are still lacking solid social-psychological and 
political science research on national security and foreign policy related 
mass attitudes, we think it reasonable to assume that truly behavioral 
predispositions have much to do with the "doseness" to people of a 
particular subject matter. As salience and closeness bang together, 
measures of salience should thus be able to teil us whether associations 
between cognitions and evaluations on the one band and dispositions 
toward behavior on the other band are to be expected. 
In view of the very different survey items that are used in the individual 
studies in this book to report on the dimension of salience, it is impossible 
to produce a neatly summarizing table, but there can be little doubt about 
the general trend. Over the past few years there appears to be a general 
increase in the absolute and relative importance ascribed to national 
security issues both for the nation as a whole in the countries analyzed and 
for individual respondents themseJves. Economic problems still by far 
out-weigh the personal importance of national security concerns for 
overwhelming majorities of the populations in the seven countries, but 
personal concern over security-related topics has definitely grown since 
those periods when it was non-existent. 
As is obvious from the studies in this book, however, a description of 
what exactly has become more important to people is not at all straightfor-
ward. The difficulty of interpreting survey data in this field exists even for 
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this key dimension of salience. Without wanting to preempt the discussion 
below, the importance of "defense" and of the "armed forces" have, for 
instance, not increased at all, although concepts like security, defense, 
military balance, etc. are widely endorsed. Moreover, if one looks at the 
levels of support for specific measures designed to increase defensive 
capabilities, one almost always finds, with the possible exception of the 
United States, that opposition clearly exceeds support. This all would 
indicate that the putative increase in salience does not stem from an 
increase in the perceived need to maintain or to improve military capabili-
ties. 
But the picture is not really clear. If people are asked to rate not the 
importance of defense and of the armed forces in general, but of "protec-
tion" against external threat or attack, this tends to be judged far more 
important. Yet one should suspect that defense in general and the armed 
forces have a lot to do with protection against threat and attack. There 
thus is a considerable degree of uncertainty even in the extent to which we 
can ascertain what is important to people and why. 
This may, of course, be related to the widespread perception that 
national security can be taken for granted, that there is no clearly visible 
and imminent threat to the values that are comprised by this notion. lt is 
not at all unusual thac demand for public goods is lowest and they are 
evaluated as least important when their supply appears satisfactorily 
guaranteed for a foreseeable span of time. 
Increases in the importance ascribed to aspects of national security are 
most clearly visible when it comes to matters of the preservation of peace, 
the prevention of war, or to nuclear weapons. Even here, however, it is not 
clear what these increases in salience readings actually mean. First, they 
are compatible with any substantive orientation toward these problems. If 
people believe the preservation of peace to have become more important 
for themselves, they can opt for stronger defense as weil as for alternative 
security arrangements or neutralism. If people rate nuclear weapons as 
more important than they did earlier, this can refiect either a desire for 
Western unilateralism in the field of nuclear arms control or, on the 
contrary, increased concern over Soviet missiles. Second, according to the 
studies contained in this book, there is little to demonstrate that the levels 
of information and interest or the feelings of competence to judge these 
matters have grown. This may suggest that the heightened salience 
readings are not due to genuine personal concern-which normally should 
lead to more information seeking and higher interest-but to a kind of 
"bandwagon" effect. Some people may judge these matters as more 
important because they are being presented all around them as more 
important than earlier. 
Third, we cannot be sure what this means in terms of disposition 
toward action. In the field of security-related attitudes we face the 
particular problem that the important actors are frequently not the 
individuals themselves, but their governments or the Alliance. When this 
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is the case, for example in the area of Western negotiating strategies on 
arms control, how are we to look at the interrelationship between salience 
and predispositions toward action? Moreover, even when the dimension of 
salience is tapped by investigating directly individuals' own inclination to 
become active, there are many unresolved problems. This is obvious, for 
example, if one compares what people say they feel should be done about 
the introduction of new nuclear missiles into Europe, and what they would 
be willing to do themselves if they disagree with deployment. 
One final aspect of the salience dimension deserves mention. There 
seems to be an intimate connection between the extent to which these 
things are rated as important at the mass level, particularly the antinuclear 
aspect of this problem, and the direction and intensity of elite debates, 
particularly confüct between competing political parties. In at least three 
of the countries surveyed here (Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands) 
the increase in the salience attributed to nuclear issues grew apace with the 
extent to which the social democratic and labor parties of these countries 
more or less outspokenly adopted anti-INF positions. This is a variation, 
of course, on the bandwagon effect and interferes with our assessments of 
how important people really think issues to be. If you are the person in the 
street, and you have seldom reflected about an issue, how can you say it is 
not so important if everybody else, including those political elites you 
trust, claims it is of utmost importance? 
More will be said about the relationship between attitudes and political 
preferences below. The point to be made here is narrower and related only 
to our consideration of salience: an increase of partisan activities may not 
actually bring a behavior-determining rise in the salience of security issues 
for mass publics. This is best illustrated by a look at the German and 
British elections of 1983. The impact of the security and missile issues was 
quite different in the two cases. The chapter on Britain shows that voting 
behavior was indeed heavily influenced by these issues, which made a 
major contribution to the Labor party's defeat. The chapter on Germany 
argues that the impact of the nuclear weapons issue on the outcome of the 
country's most recent election was only marginal. Thus what one might 
interpret as a measure of increased salience did not prove in the German 
case to be behavior-determining and hence may not be a measure of 
increased salience at all. In the British case, the issue was obviously salient 
enough to determine voting patterns. 
This illustrates clearly how imperfect our knowledge of what deter-
mines salience and behavior really is. All we can say about the past few 
years is that we can observe an apparent rise in the salience of national 
security issues but that existing data and methods do not allow us to 
determine exactly what has increased in importance or why. What is 
certain is that the relative salience of these issues generally remains low 
and one therefore confronts the double difficulty of, on the one hand, 
greater uncertainty in how accurately we can measure public attitudes 
and, on the other, even when we can be relatively certain of our measure-
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ments, to determine how significant these are for political decision making 
because of their presumed minimal effect on behavior. This in no way is 
meant to deny the relevance of public opinion data in the area of national 
security policy but to voice a sharp word of caution about its over-
interpretation. In spite of these constraints, there are a good number of 
things one can say about the evolution of public attitudes in this area and 
some of these do have important implications for policy. 
THE SOVIET UNION: A MORE NORMAL ADVERSARY 
Analyzing public attitudes toward the Soviet Union is perhaps the most 
straightforward of the summarizing tasks in this final chapter. While the 
data are certainly not uniform in quantity or quality across the Allied 
countries studied here, there is a relatively clear picture that emerges. And 
the picture is at considerable variance with many current notions about 
how people see the Soviets. 
There are three basic dimensions to popular perceptions of the Soviet 
Union that must be distinguished in order for one to grasp fully how these 
may affect attitudes toward Western policy alternatives. In each there have 
seemingly been important changes from earlier parts of the postwar 
period, seemingly because in some cases we have the data to trace the 
changes and in other cases we are reduced to an educated guess as to what 
the earlier data would have looked like. 
The first dimension of perceptions concerns general attitudes toward 
the Soviet Union as an international actor. There is no ambiguity. The 
Soviet Union is clearly perceived as an adversary and not as a benign 
adversary. Since the early 1970s, attitudes in all Western countries have 
deteriorated markedly. Anti-Soviet feelings are strong and widespread. 
Levels of trust in Soviet goodwill are minimal. Moreover, to preempt 
somewhat the discussion below, there is absolutely no comparison be-
tween the judgments made of the Soviet Union and the questioning of 
U.S. policy that has occurred. The larger public does not yet consider the 
two superpowers as cut from the same cloth. In other words, the evidence, 
at least at this general level, does not support the contention that if only 
people understood the nature of Soviet objectives they would in turn 
support more actively and uniformly efforts to strengthen Western de-
fenses. 
The second dimension concerns the surprising absence of a link be-
tween perceptions of the Soviet Union and domestic political preference. 
To be sure, there is some variance in attitudes expressed as one moves 
from left to right across the political spectrum in each of our countries. 
But this is simply not of the same order as it must have been in previous 
periods. While the data are not available to prove this, what one can 
demonstrate is that there are virtually no remaining pockets of opinion 
that consider the Soviet Union tobe an alternative model of society, and 
this even includes Communists and leftist intellectuals for many of whom 
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this would have been the case some two decades ago. The final blow 
undoubtedly occurred at different moments in our various countries, but 
involved in one form or another what the chapter on France refers to as 
the Gulag effect. This change is in many ways more important than the 
first as it indicates that there is no longer the same link between attitudes 
toward the Soviet Union and attitudes toward domestic political order. 
Basic attitudes toward the Soviet Union transcend domestic politics and 
the Soviet Union is viewed as largely irrelevant to the underlying problems 
of Western industrial society. 
Finally, there is the fact that growing scepticism about the Soviet Union 
does not translate into the perception of a greater direct threat to Western 
security. The growth of Soviet military power is widely acknowledged, as 
is the incompatibility of many Soviet and Western security objectives. But 
this has not resulted in the perception of increased threat. The evidence 
would indicate that this has less to do with perceptions of the Soviet Union 
than with perceptions of what it is that can threaten Western security. A 
threat implies something immediate, and it is precisely this immediacy 
that is absent in popular perceptions of a Soviet menace. The Soviet 
military buildup or Soviet behavior is seen to be the primary source of 
international tensions in most countries but this simply does not get 
equated with an immediate, tangible threat. And this too is an apparent 
change from earlier periods. A far-less-powerful Soviet Union was once 
more widely perceived, or so one can surmise, as a more direct threat to 
the West than the global superpower that has now achieved equivalent 
status with the United States. 
What seems to have transpired, if one puts these three dimensions 
together, is that for Western publics, the Soviet Union has become a more 
normal power; an international actor more like others. This was caused or 
made possible by the break in the link to domestic political strife. In turn, 
it seems to have changed entirely the context in which Western security 
policy must be legitimized. 
Perceptions of the Soviet Union no longer appear to be the primary 
determinant of support for Western policy toward the Soviet Union. 
Rather it appears to be attitudes toward military power, Soviet or West-
ern, that are the key factor. This will be discussed further but the point to 
be borne in mind is that popular attitudes toward the meaning of Soviet 
military power do not seem to stem from attitudes toward the Soviet 
Union itself and this would appear tobe new. As a result, policies to deal 
with the growth of Soviet military power will have to be justified in terms 
that go beyond simply evoking a negative image of the Soviet system or 
Soviet objectives. These already exist. 
One of the most critical foci of current policy disputes within the 
Alliance concerns the most appropriate Western political strategy for 
dealing with the Soviet Union now that it has hecome a truly global 
superpower. As should be eminently clear from the above, this is not 
simply a continuation of old disputes from earlier times, even though it 
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may frequently appear so. lt is revealing that the intensity of debate 
among policy elites stands in contrast to a considerable multipartisan 
consensus that our data would indicate exists in the population at Jarge. 
People are widely convinced that the West will have to live with the Soviet 
adversary, rather than isolate it or "defeat it," for the foreseeable future, 
and this is not an issue that distinguishes Europeans from Americans. 
While one enters much more slippery terrain in trying to measure popular 
attitudes on specific policy alternatives, it is nevertheless clear that Allied 
policy toward the East must embody active attempts to regulate East-West 
competition in order to command the popular support indispensable to its 
viability. 
SECURITY: MORE MAY MEAN LESS 
While we have only sparse data for earlier periods, one can say wirb 
confidence that the concept of security that we assume dominated the early 
postwar years--primarily military, primarily East-West-no longer exists. 
The problem is, it has not been replaced by something concrete but rather 
by something as yet in constant ßux. One is thus reduced to describing 
specific elements of continuity and elements of change. 
A frequently asserted proposition today is that Western societies have 
grown incapable of defending themselves. The growth of the welfare state 
has supposedly undermined populations' willingness to spend what is 
necessary to counter a relentless Soviel military buildup. lt is perplexing 
that anyone should believe there is anything new in popular preferences 
for spending money on things other than defense. Moreover, the data 
collected in our country profiles yield a far more nuanced picture of 
popular attitudes than that implied by the oversimplified premises so 
frequently heard today. 
To begin with, popular majorities do not reject the concept of defense. 
On the contrary, strong majorities favor the principle of armed resistance 
if attacked. Military institutions obtain widespread support in most of the 
countries studied here. And there is broad acceptance of the need to 
maintain a balance of power between East and West as a basic prerequisite 
of Western security. 
These are key general principles upon which Allied security is based 
and they all receive substantial popular endorsement. The problem is that 
public attitudes in this area are characterized by ambivalence: support for 
the general concept is tempered by scepticism about the consequences that 
flow from this support, in this case the need to have the means to defend 
oneself against attack or to maintain a balance of power. Interpreting this 
ambivalence runs into two interrelated difficulties. First, this illustrates 
perfectly an area where asking respondents for judgments on specific 
policy alternatives easily overtaxes their detailed knowledge; their re-
sponses will thus most likely be determined by affective considerations. 
And second, precisely because the affective content of most hypothetical 
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futures in this area are unpleasant (spending more money, fighting wars, 
and so on), one is likely to heighten the automatic opposition. Where is the 
reality, in the general support or in the rejection of the specific? 
We will never be able to determine through survey research what the 
responses of populations would be in a real crisis situation. One could 
hypothesize that the levels of support as reflected in opinion polls for such 
things as defense spending are actually quite irrelevant to the require-
ments of a nation if a war were tfuly to occur. Unless these attitudes were 
to become so salient that they determined voting patterns of large num-
bers of people, something which appears unlikely given previous experi-
ence, then it is unlikely that declared popular opposition to defense 
spending will determine the capacity of Western nations to defend them-
selves should it prove tobe necessary. Arguments about guns vs. butter 
not only seem to misrepresent the considerations that are operative in 
determining popular attitudes toward defense issues but may simply be 
missing the point entirely, at least for Western populations at large. 
The data gathered in this book would indicate that the point probably 
does lie elsewhere, and not in a willingness or unwillingness to spend for 
defense or to defend oneself. The scepticism about spending on defense 
appears to be linked to two other major considerations, each of which may 
not actually be all that new but certainly is present today. Both concern 
the relevance of military power in dealing with today's security problems. 
The two considerations are actually the obverse of each other. The first 
is a general belief, a belief that has become pervasive, that more military 
power does not mean more security. In Europe particularly the contribu-
tion of increased military power to increasing security is widely ques-
tioned. The feasibility of defense is not generally considered to be evident. 
Moreover, the growth of military power is often considered to be the 
"primary threat to security." More arms make confilct more likely. This is 
something perceived as more immediate and more concrete than "the 
Soviet threat." Soviet military power seems to be perceived in terms 
similar to that of the West: dangerous but no more usable. Military power 
and the logic that drives its acquisition are being questioned, especially in 
the nuclear age where it is considered more destructive and less usable 
than ever. The requirements of security are thus frequently perceived as 
getting in the way of peace, a concept that has reached the pinnacle in the 
hierarchy of values. People tend to focus more on how Western policy may 
threaten peace and less on the military requirements for maintaining 
security. 
The other side of the coin is the belief that increased security can best be 
achieved by reducing the role of military confrontation in providing that 
security. Open-ended military competition with the East finds no support 
whatsoever despite support for general principles such as the balance of 
power. There seems tobe a conviction, and this is obviously an extrapola-
tion from the data, that the system that has provided security remains 
simultaneously both necessary and, in and of itself, a possible source of 
insecurity. Hence the system must be improved. The result is a strong 
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preference for arms control measures over defense improvements in all 
countries surveyed, including the United States. One can surmise that this 
must stem from something like a desire to control both the enemy and 
oneself more efficiently. 
One thus has support for the general principles of Western defense 
combined with conviction that matters must be better managed. What is 
interesting is the multipartisan nature of the belief in both of these points. 
To be sure, there exist differences in the attitudes of those who support 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties from the supporters of Conserva-
tives or Christian Democrats. But these differences are greatest in re-
sponse to specific questions on pofü:y alternatives, in other words, in areas 
where we are least sure of what exactly we are measuring. The range of 
support for the more general considerations just discussed is in fact 
surprisingly broad. 
DETERRENCE: THE FALLOUT IS NUCLEAR UNCERTAINTY 
Issues of nuclear weapons and deterrence are the primary reason for the 
increased interest over the past few years in public perceptions of Western 
security policies. Ironically, this area may in some ways be the least 
revealing of the four thematic clusters treated in this book. As in the 
previous section, one finds the dichotomy of support for the general and 
rejection of the specific. But as in the case of Soviet military power, one is 
frequently measuring attitudes that are almost certainly determined by 
factors other than nuclear. And it is unlikely that one has recently been 
witnessing a profound change in attitudes about nuclear weapons; more 
likely one has seen attitudes coming to the surface that long existed but 
have ceased to be latent because of changes in context. 
A primary thesis of the protest movements has been that populations 
are no longer willing to accept the basic prem.ises that have underpinned 
Western deterrent strategy during the postwar period. Despite the pas-
sions that nuclear issues evoke today, the available evidence indicates that 
this generally is not the case, not yet at least; only in rather' well-defined 
strata in one or two countries (Norway and the Netherlands but not, for 
instance, in the Federal Republic) does one find deep-seated nuclear 
rejectionism. To be sure, there are few people who like nuclear weapons, 
and few people feel comfortable with the idea of more nuclear weapons. 
But this is probably not new and such general predispositions translate 
more into a generalized fear and confusion than into well-articulated 
opposition to Western strategy. 
The data indicate that peoples' attitudes toward nuclear deterrence are 
probably composed of four distinct components. The first emerges as 
strong support for the general concept. This is not surprising, as deter-
rence implies avoiding war. Our data are uneven, but this appears tobe 
the state of opinion across the political spectrum for all countries sur-
veyed. 
The second component is that the logic of deterrence is seemingly 
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rejected, that is, that a weapon must be usable in order to deter. People 
tend to believe that nuclear weapons themselves have made war impos-
sible, at least as a "rational" extension of political conflict. The new or 
renewed confrontation with the nuclear paradox-if a weapon can never 
be used, the adversary has nothing to fear-has heightened the fear that 
something may go wrong-if a weapon is usable, it may be used. There is 
widespread rejection of nuclear weapons as instruments of war fighting. 
Which is linked to the third component: that people appear to make no 
distinction among nuclear weapons. For populations at large, there is only 
one nuclear threshold to be crossed. Thus, the relentless progress of 
technology that has unleashed major debates among experts about the 
meaning of the increased precision of ballistic missiles has as yet not had a 
similar impact on the attitudes of populations at large. If anything, the 
expert debate may have reinforced peoples' tendency to treat all nuclear 
weapons as equal. 
The final component is that, in those places where data are available, 
people continue to believe that they have insufficient expertise to make 
judgments about issues of military strategy. They regularly look to their 
governments to make responsible policy in this area. This declared 
preference is clearly substantiated by the extent to which peoples' atti-
tudes can be influenced on nuclear issues by the way in which survey 
questions are worded. For instance, depending on whether the need for 
new INF in Europe is linked to Soviet behavior or the need for balance on 
the one band, or to the alternative of an arms control solution on the other, 
one gets a totally different set of responses. This is normally the mark of 
relatively low salience and probably indicates that the affective content of 
the question (Soviet Union, balance, arms control) overrides the specific 
nuclear considerations. 
Nuclear weapons thus are not liked but appear to be accepted as a 
necessary evil for majorities of populations in most of the countries 
profiled in this book. Even in Norway the distaste for nuclear weapons 
seems tobe overriden by attachment to the Alliance. Nevertheless, there 
is growing concern about Western strategy as people have become sensi-
tized by the political debates over the past two years. But most people, 
even if they have opinions, do not feel particularly strongly about the 
nuclear issue, at least not strongly enough to influence voting behavior. 
Most importantly attitudes toward nuclear weapons are for many people 
clearly a function of other beliefs, the most important of which would 
seem tobe those described in the last section. Nuclear weapons themselves 
seem to be the effect, not the cause. 
ALLIES: WHAT BURDEN? WHICH PROFILE? 
lt is frequently asserted that the Allies are drifting apart at the grass roots. 
Conflicts over policies toward the Soviet Union are supposed to reflect the 
growth of deep-seated neutralist or pacifü;t tendencies in Western Europe; 
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the counterpart is seen to be growing American weariness with the 
frustrations of Alliance engagement, and particularly those pusillanimous 
Europeans. Moreover, anti-Americanism is also frequently claimed tobe 
on the rise in Western Europe. 
Much of this is obviously true for specific segments of elite opinion in 
the various member states of the Alliance. But the evidence indicates that 
the grass roots have not yet been aff ected as dramatically as the above 
would indicate. Populations at large retain a strong attachment to the 
Atlantic Alliance, with support for the Alliance actually increasing slightly 
over the past few years in most countries. Most Western Europeans 
consider NATO to be essential to their security. Support for alternative 
arrangements is in fact surprisingly low in all West European countries 
except Italy, seemingly indicating a rather strong preference for the 
Alliance rather than simply a resignation to its necessity. Nor has support 
for NATO diminished in the United States. Moreover, there are even 
indications that European fears of being abandoned by the United States 
in a crisis with the Soviets-in other words, the traditional fear that the 
Alliance won't work-have been on the wane in recent years. 
But, as has already been seen in the cases of defense and deterrence, 
support for the general concept does not always translate into support for 
specific policies. There remains a belief that NATO is the best way to 
organize security, but not necessarily that current Alliance efforts are the 
best way to pursue that security. The best examples of this have already 
been discussed in the two previous sections: the considerable opposition to 
spending more on defense, despite the fact that there has been a specific 
Alliance decision calling for an annual three percent increase in spending; 
and the equally considerable distaste for the deployment of new nuclear 
weapons as a part of the December 1979 double-track decision. In both 
cases, we have argued that these opinions seem to be conditioned by 
another factor, in fact the same factor: attitudes toward the relevance of 
military power in dealing with today's security problems. By themselves 
they do not seem to be salient enough to determine political pref erences 
for more than a handful of people. This may also indicate that at this level, 
the support for the Alliance is unlikely to be affected by the distaste for 
these issQes. 
But there is a different dimension to the conflict between the general 
and the specific, a dimension that is by no means new but the characteris-
tics of which may be. The stable or increasing attachment to the Alliance 
on both sides of the Atlantic has been accompanied by a rather dramatic 
mutual loss of confidence of each side in the other. 
Traditionally, Americans have feit that Europeans were bearing far too 
little of the burden for their own security. The new version of the problem 
for political leaders in Washington is the "cocoon mentality" they find in 
European capitals in the face of an expanded Western security problem 
that touches all corners of the globe. For the moment, it does not appear 
that these new frustrations of American political elites have significantly 
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penetrated the population at large but the more traditional concern with 
spending too much to defend the Europeans is real and substantial. Over 
the last three decades this has been a periodically resurgent concern that 
has never yet resulted in a sharp drop in support for the Alliance, but then 
again in earlier periods the United States had an unchallenged military and 
economic supremacy. lt would thus be foolish to predict the future only on 
the basis of the past record; the concern about equitable sharing of the 
defense burden may grow rather than dissipate. 
The other side of the coin is the seemingly sharper contradiction 
between European belief in the Alliance and the sharp drop of confidence 
in the United States. At the level of the mass public, this cannot yet be 
interpreted as true anti-Americanism, for while there has been a visible 
decline in respect for the United States, positive opinions regularly 
outweigh the negative by a factor of two to one. Nor is there evidence to 
support the contention that the two superpowers are seen in the same 
terms. Criticism of U.S. policy is not accompanied by the same disavowal 
of the system as in the Soviet case and America is still considered to be 
essential to European security. 
But there exists a profound concern about the United States and levels 
of trust seem to have dropped to the lowest point since the Second World 
War. Unfortunately this is another case in which earlier data are sparse 
and it is impossible to know whether the figures are really more dramatic 
or whether it just seems as if they must be. What one can say, however, is 
that this time it is less U.S. reliability and more U.S. political judgment 
that is being called into question. This coincides with and perhaps is the 
source of substantial willingness to see European governments pursue 
policies different from those of the United States if European and Ameri-
can "interests" are deemed in conflict with one another. While differences 
in attitude do exist according to political preference on this issue, majori-
ties of all parties are on the same side of the issue. In a sense, one is 
tempted to argue that for Europeans, the United States has become a more 
normal ally just as the Soviet Union has become a more normal adversary. 
If this is in fact the correct interpretation of what has been happening, 
then policy conflict with the United States is unlikely to spill over into 
diminishing support for the Alliance but simply into a greater desire to 
pursue policies, independently if necessary, that are more in tune with 
perceived European interests. At the same time, common sense would 
indicate that support for the Alliance will be sorely tested by perpetual 
policy conflicts that reinforce the perception of different or diverging 
interests rather than focus on issues where interests remain convergent. 
There may in fact be no life-threatening contradiction between strong 
support for the Alliance and distaste for some of its policies. But this will 
remain true only under one condition: that the policies disliked are not 
assumed to reßect a general orientation of the Alliance in an unacceptable 
direction. And this is where the current risk comes in if we are correct in 
our analysis that the opposition to increased def ense spending or to new 
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nuclear systems is primarily based on deeper concerns about the posture 
of the Alliance toward the role of military power in dealing with today's 
.security dilemmas. 
Popular commitment to the Atlantic Alliance is to a defensive Alliance 
with no aggressive content. lt is hard to believe that overwhelming support 
for the Alliance will continue to exist if the Alliance is increasingly 
perceived to stand for the perpetuation of conditions which are the source 
of widespread popular concern, namely an open-ended arms race and 
permanent confrontation with the Soviet Union. lf the West is incapable 
of formulating a coherent strategy to shape a less dangerous long-term 
relationship between East and West, not only Alliance policies, but the 
Alliance itself may become a source of controversy. lf it is successful in 
conducting such a strategy, the opposition to spending on defense or to 
necessary modernization efforts is likely to diminish substantially if not 
disappear. Support for the Alliance will depend on what it stands for. 
CORRELATES OF PUBLIC OPINION ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
The previous discussion has attempted to draw some general conclusions 
about what may actually have changed over the past few years in public 
opinion on national security and what the significance of these changes 
may be. By its nature, the discussion has concentrated on those factors 
that are relevant across national boundaries and that are relevant across a 
broad spectrum of opinion within each of the countries studied. At the 
same time, we consider it important to give at least abrief review of factors 
that generally are assumed to explain variations of opinion within coun-
tries, even if these variations are less important for the specific points that 
have been raised in the previous discussion. 
Age. Many people believe that generational change is a major factor 
determining problems the Western Alliance currently faces regarding 
popular acceptance of its policies. The new generations born after the 
Second World War, who have little direct experience of foreign threat, 
supposedly hold views on national security that are dramatically different 
from those previous generations that built the Alliance. The analogy often 
used is that of people living along a river that long ago ceased to be 
threatening because of the construction of solid dams, and who start to ask 
whether these oversized dams are really required. 
There is some evidence to support the view that it is this "successor 
generation" that most intensely challenges established Western security 
policy. But if the community of activists tends tobe relatively young, the 
young do not necessarily tend to be activist. The core groups of current 
defense-related protest can be defined more precisely in terms of the 
young with a high level of education. The problem, however, is that this is 
not at all new or exciting: the younger and better-educated have long been 
a driving force of protest, at least since student unrest in the sixties, be it 
directed against nuclear power, imperialism, pollution and destruction of 
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the environment, inequality, or established ways and means for attempt-
ing to provide national security. 
To the extent that the studies contained in this book report breakdowns 
of opinions by age, the "selective recruitment" of the young "elite" into 
political activism is not repeated at the mass level. It is certainly true that 
attitudinal distinctions between age groups exist. The younger people are, 
the more likely they are in all of the surveyed nations to view the Eastern 
bloc as less threatening or superior, the less they believe in military 
defense and deterrence as prerequisites for peace and security, the less 
favorable they are toward the United States and the Atlantic Alliance, and 
finally, the more pessimistic they are about the prospects of maintaining 
peace and of their own physical survival. However, these differences 
across age groups are not really dramatic, certainly not as significant as 
across other background variables, such as sex, and they may even not be 
new at all. If one compares the data with the apocalyptic visions of the 
successor generation willing to abandon everything that has been sacro-
sanct in the field of national security, the differences according to age 
reported in the previous studies are really rather small. As none of our 
authors had extended time series data available, we are unable to conclude 
with any certainty whether observable distinctions are due to cohort 
effects or to life-cycle effects, whether they will persist into the future or 
mellow as people get older. But the phenomenon of the successor genera-
tion may be no more or less than it always has been, and certainly it is 
more an issue of emerging elites rather than of the population at large, as 
with so many of the issues described in this book. 
Partisan Affiliation. In discussing the problems of measuring sali-
ence, we have already mentioned that there is a direct relationship 
between the levels of opposition to established national security policy 
from a major party and apparent increases in the importance ascribed to 
these matters in public opinion, but that this does not automatically 
translate into increases in popular activism. Clearly there is need for a 
greater understanding of the interrelationship between political affiliation 
and the development of opinion. Yet, as with so many of the issues raised 
in this chapter, we do not have the possibility to do more than indicate 
those factors that deserve tobe explored more systematically. 
From the studies in this book it has become overwhelmingly clear that 
of all the background variables by which opinions on national security 
have been broken down (e.g., sex, age, social dass, education), party 
preference has by far the most discriminating power. This is not at all 
surprising, and it should be expected for at least two reasons. First, if 
people feel very strongly about an issue, if this issue dominates their 
political outlooks, they will tend to prefer the party that is closest to them 
on this issue. This shift of voter preference clearly increases the association 
between party preferences and issue positions. Second, it is part of parties' 
everyday business to clarify their positions and policies on the issues of the 
day. People who care less intensely about particular issues will thus also 
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receive information about how "their" party-that they prefer for very 
different reasons-views these problems. If they have not held any 
opinions on this issue before, or have held conßicting attitudes, they can 
be "educated" to a certain extent; people who already have believed what 
they now hear is their party's position have their opinions reinforced. 
Political parties are institutions that mobilize politically and structure 
public opinion, and they have the machinery to do so. 
This interaction between public opinion and partisan politics can also 
run the other way: if public opinion is seen as shifting without being led by 
a major party, one or more parties will be likely to adapt to what they see 
as a shift in opinion away from previous party positions. In market 
terminology, this can be regarded as adaption to changes in the structure 
of demand. In the particular field of protest against established national 
security po1icy, such adaptation of partisan positions to perceived changes 
in public opinion may be an attempt to capitalize electorally on issues of 
popular emotion, or to avoid the political consequences of failing to satisfy 
that demand. Preservation of the market, integration of those challenging 
the system, may in fact be more important than the revenue from 
satisfying a particular demand. More often than not, all these processes 
will be at work at once so that in the end it becomes extremely difficult to 
establish whether the chicken or the egg, changes in public opinion or in 
parties' positions, started the whole feedback loop. Resolving this prob-
lem is not important here, anyway. What matters is that there are clear 
and indisputable reasons for high covariation between public opinion on 
national security and party preference. 
The differences in defense-related opinions across adherents of different 
political parties are quite considerable in almost all the countries investi-
gated in this volume. France and the United States, on the whole, exhibit 
the lowest partisan polarization of defense attitudes, the most important 
reason probably being that in these countries there have been no parties 
trying to lead or to capitalize on protest. With all due consideration given 
to important differences, the situation in France now is somewhat parallel 
to conditions in Germany before the change in government in fall 1982. 
With Socialists or Social Democrats in government and carrying the 
responsibility for official security policy and with bourgeois parties form-
ing the opposition, there are no focal points beyond sectarian groups 
around which protest and opposition could crystallize. 
The differences in defense-related attitudes between followers of differ-
ent parties in the seven nations investigated here generally are of the same 
order of magnitude, and they generally follow a neat left-right division. 
The majority position on a particular issue is frequently reversed for 
adherents of different parties, with followers of the more right-wing party 
favoring and with supporters of the more left-wing party opposing specific 
programs or positions favorable to the Western Alliance or its policies. 
However, these differences are far from representing complete polariza-
tion. 
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On some issues the majorities of each party are on the same side of an 
issue. Many of those just discussed fall into this category. Moreover, 
opinions are seldom expressed in purely black and white terms. Nor do 
attitudes completely coincide with preferences for the major parties. Even 
though clifferences reported in this book for adherents of competing 
parties sometimes exceed 30 or even 40 percent, substantial proportions of 
party followers on both sides obviously do not toe the party line. Such 
"dissidents" can even be majorities among those intending to vote for a 
particular party. In Germany, the percentages in the summer 1983 of self-
professed Green voters who held NATO indispensable as well as of 
Christian Democratic voters who preferred continuing arms control nego-
tiations to the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe were both 
around 60 percent. 
There is only one reasonable interpretation for this. This disagreement 
with the proclaimed position of the preferred party must be compensated 
for by other, more salient considerations where one finds oneself in 
agreement with one's party. Thus, while partisan affiliation is strongly 
related to opinions on defense matters, more strongly than any of the other 
background variables investigated in this book, the causation can run 
either way and considerable shares of the populations manage to live with 
opinions on def ense that they do not share with the party they pref er. In 
the context of issues raised earlier, this may again be evidence of limited 
personal importance of these matters. 
The Analytical Agenda 
We warned readers in the introduction to this book that even the most 
complete inventory of public opinion data would inevitably provide an 
imperfect analytic structure or theoretical framework for explaining what 
has happened in the field of public opinion on national security over the 
past couple of years, let alone for predicting future developments. We 
have tried in this book to provide a rather complete overview of existing 
data, and indeed there are a considerable number of important things one 
can say about changes in public opinion, although these are not necessarily 
those things that one has been hearing so often over the past several years. 
But the task of filling the gaps in our theoretical knowledge must remain 
for another volume. What one can do on the basis of the work collected 
here is to demonstrate why one must be extremely careful in interpreting 
the kind of data presented and to point to those areas where further 
research is likely to provide key additional insights. 
The scope for further research is vast. Perhaps the key area to be 
explored concerns how people acquire interest in or particular views on 
foreign policy or national security. We know too little about why people, 
and what kind of people, become attentive to these issue areas after not 
having been so for some time. We do not know how attitudes of this kind 
are structured nor how they depend upon other sets of political or non-
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political attitudes. We have insufficient understanding of what causes 
issues of this kind to become the focus of political debate at the elite or 
mass levels. 
lt appears that much of what we have observed over the past couple of 
years, particularly the debates on nuclear issues, may come tobe regarded 
as a classical example of mass-elite interactions in the realm of political 
opinion formation, but our intellectual grasp of these processes is far from 
being complete. Political and social elites clearly stimulate the type of 
debates and activities we have witnessed recently, but we need tobe able 
to disentanglc this from other factors that cause shifts in popular concern. 
The role of the media also deserves close attention in this context. 
The list of desiderata is thus long. Unfortunately even very detailed 
future research will probably not be able to explain definitively one of the 
key issues considered in this book: whether public response to security 
questions in recent years signals a genuine departure from previous public 
images or attitudes. The discrepancy between the abundance of current 
and the scarcity of earlier comparable data cannot be overcome. We can 
only submit, on the basis of the contributions to this volume, that many 
security-related attitudes currently being marketed as novel are really not 
that different from those observed in earlier years. For many of the more 
specific attitudes that are being polled today, all we can do is speculate that 
results would not have been much different bad one polled the same items 
ten, 20 or 30 years ago. This lack of historically comparable data is not 
exclusively due to negligence or lack of interest in continuous observation 
on the part of survey researchers but also to the winds of change: as the 
issues of the day move on, so does the focus of survey research. 
Perhaps the most urgent task for future research is the construction of a 
more adequate conceptual breakdown of the types of attitudes we are 
dealing with in this issue area. In a study like this, one is dealing with 
hundreds and thousands of tiny pieces of information that reßect how 
individuals respond to a wide variety of survey items. The problem for the 
researcher as well as for the political decision maker is to make sense out of 
such a multitude of isolated observations. These observations taken by 
themselves deliver an extremely complex impression, but it should be 
remembered that at the individual level there are most likely attitudinal 
structures and a few basic attitudinal dimensions that underlie these 
confusing myriads of recorded opinions. What needs to be done, then, is 
to identify these underlying dimensions in order to reduce the complexity 
of observations by means of an adequate conceptual and theoretical model. 
Such a conceptual clarification would have to take into account the 
substantive content of attitudes, not only the basic analytic categories used 
in social psychology for classifying attitudes. Only in this way would it be 
possible, in the long run, to arrive at a more useful theoretical representa-
tion of this sector of public opinion. 
This reduction of many scattered measurements to a small number of 
basic attitudinal dimensions (e.g., optimism vs. pessimism, aggression, 
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salience) is required not only to get a better notion of the structure of 
attitudes but also to be better aware of the message the data convey. The 
studies in this volume make it clear that survey responses on national 
security items should not carelessly be taken at face value. lt is, for 
instance, mentioned again and again that results, for instance, may have 
been influenced by question wording. One can assume that this occurs 
most frequently when people are polled about problems where they have 
little information or feel personally not very involved. In a more abstract 
sense, to say that a survey instrument has an impact upon responses 
implies nothing more than that the particular attitude you want to 
measure using that particular instrument is wiped out or "overpowered" 
by another attitudinal dimension that the survey item taps. As we have to 
expect this to happen quite frequently in our issue area, only a clear 
conceptual and theoretical framework can make us realize what dimen-
sions of defense-related attitudes can be assessed empirically more or less 
reliably and validly. 
One could speculate, as we have on several occasions, that the one 
dimension that probably can be measured with some degree of confidence 
is the affective one: How do people feel about actors? What national 
stereotypes do they have? How do they value overall national goals such as 
peace, independence, security, etc? The problems seem to begin as soon as 
we hit the cognitive and behavioral components of attitudes, as happens 
when one asks the respondent to evaluate policy alternatives. On the basis 
of the information collected in this volume, we would hypothesize, at a 
very abstract level, that the more remote cognitions are from individuals 
and the more remote the behavioral side of the attitude is, (for example, 
individuals believe that their nation, as opposed to themselves, should do 
this or that), the more the affective component of the attitude will 
"overpower" the cognitive and behavioral components. 
Without the kind of theoretical and conceptual framework we are 
calling for, one can do little but report attitudinal inconsistencies and call 
for further investigation. lt must be remembered, to repeat a previous 
point, that in almost all the nations studied in this book the same type of 
contradiction could be observed: deterrence, military defense, and the 
Atlantic Alliance are accepted by majorities of respondents as very general 
and abstract principles, but specific strategies pursued by nations to 
further these goals find little enthusiasm (e.g., defense spending, or 
particular weapons systems). The problem then becomes what is the true 
measure, consent to the general goals or rejection of instruments to further 
them? Depending on one's political position, one will seize upon the one 
or the other. The result is the abuse of public opinion data to which we 
have already become so accustomed that we almost forget to consider it an 
abuse. 
We have attempted to give some plausible explanations for the apparent 
inconsistency between acceptance of overall goals and rejection of instru-
ments to implement them. And naturally this is not at all confined to the 
sector of national security. The same pattern of attitudes can be found, for 
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example, regarding environmental protection, where consensus on the 
overall goal can coexist with widespread unwillingness to sacrifice person-
ally. However, as the issue of personal sacrifice usually is not at stake in 
the field of national security, uncertainty over what is really being assessed 
is much greater here. Perhaps the general answer is straightforward: 
general political goals that commonly bear positive affective evaluation are 
endorsed, while everything that would have to be done to promote these 
goals of deterrence, defense, independence, and so on, carries unpleasant 
affective connotations (military spending, weapons, war) and therefore is 
rejected. Most of our arguments above are based on the assumption that it 
is indeed the affective content that is the determinant. However this may 
be, only theoretical and conceptual progress is going to help us to sort out 
the various possible interpretations and to subject them to empirical 
investigation. 
A final point is a word of warning. The clifficulties that have been 
described suggest that the scope for--conscious or unconscious-distor-
tion or manipulation of public opinion data on national security should not 
be underestimated. The further we move away from the cognitive, 
everyday experience of individuals and from their own behavioral inven-
tory, the more it is likely that their survey responses will be dominated by 
a few basic affective attitudinal dimensions. lt would be exaggerating to 
claim that an appropriate choice of question wording can produce almost 
any survey results at the level of mass public opinion on national security. 
But the range of findings that already are available for some topics, or that 
could in all likelihood be produced in the future, is very wide indeed. 
The best example is the issue of lNF deployment in Western Europe. 
One could let respondents choose between negotiations and deployment; 
one could ask them whether the West should refrain from deployment 
even if SS-20 missiles continued to be targeted on Western Europe; one 
could tie missile deployment to the notion of a "military balance" ( or its 
re-establishment); one could connect it to the need to evoke compromises 
from the East during negotiations; one could imply that not deploying 
means abandoning NATO. Depending on the choice of the stimulus, one 
receives substantial majorities in favor of deployment or in opposition. lt 
is the business of political decision makers and their administrative, 
partisan, or consulting foot soldiers to hit each other over the head with 
these types of data, but it is the job of the serious scholar to find out why 
one observes such different majorities with these different instruments. 
Much has been said in the chapters of this book concerning these 
problems in an ad-hoc fashion. What is now needed is a firm theoretical 
base for the more or less informed speculation we have laid out. 
The Political Challenge 
The agenda for future research is substantial. But the analyses presented 
in this volume already advance considerably our ability to identify some 
important implications for the conduct of policy within the Alliance. 
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The general question with which we have to deal, of course, is whether 
popular consensus over national security policies has actually broken 
down and what this might mean in terms of the leeway political decision 
makers have for specific policies; Disregarding a number of important 
national particularities and necessary qualifications, we can say that across 
the sample of nations studied here, the changes that have occurred at the 
mass level over the past couple of years in either the salience or the 
acceptance of established national security policy are far less dramatic than 
one would have suspected on the basis of the intensity and direction of 
disagreement among political elites. Restrictions on the range of national 
security options open to decision makers are far more strongly imposed by 
the positions taken and articulated by political and social elites and 
counterelites than by public opinion at large. In terms of popular accept-
ance, the decision latitude for policy makers still appears to be rau'ler 
wide. 
To project how limitations on national security policy will look during 
the coming period would thus primarily require predictions about the 
further development of partisan rivalries over these issues and of the peace 
movements and their future impact. This is obviously beyond the scope of 
this study. Moreover, one can only speculate about what is going to 
happen to these groups of activists and their supporters in important social 
and political Strata once the primary issue around which they have been 
formed, the deployment of new INF in Europe, has been resolved one 
way or the other. 
That political decision makers enjoy considerable leeway in the field of 
national security policy in terms of its acceptance by publics at large is 
certainly bound to displease highly motivated and committed followers of 
peace movements as this contradicts their notion, employed as a political 
weapon, that there is a "revolt of the masses" against established national 
security policy. All we can say is that, judging from the data compiled in 
this book, such a revolt is not taking place. To be sure, there has been 
widespread opposition against the deployment of new American nuclear 
missiles in Europe, but as should have become abundantly clear, this is not 
surprising, and probably not even new. Very few people are really 
enthusiastic about nuclear weapons. Moreover, many other aspects of 
military preparations, for example military spending, are viewed almost 
equally critically. However, for great majorities of populations at large 
these sentiments are not personally salient enough to create the urgent 
desire to express intense disagreement or to oppose actively these compo-
nents of military preparations for deterrence and defense. There is little 
indication that most of those who engaged in anti-INF activities over the 
past few months would not be willing to abide by the rules of the political 
game. 
At the same time, this is not to imply that the public at large places no 
constraints on Western policy makers. To begin with, relying on a "silent 
majority" in support of such policies is not a viable long-term strategy. 
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Politics is not conducted by the body politic, but by political and social 
elites. A permanent challenge to major components of one's political 
positions is most likely not endurable. True, public opinion in general 
tends to be largely permissive on national security issues and, at least 
initially, passive in the process. But people tend to form their opinions in 
this area with reference to positions taken by parties with whom they have 
chosen to identify themselves or whom they at least vote for on the basis of 
other, usually economic and social considerations. Popular consensus is to 
a great extent a function of political consensus. Thus, in the longer run, 
sustained and well-articulated dissent by opinion leaders and publicized 
groups over key elements of national security policy will almost inevitably 
show certain effects on public opinion as a whole. 
If political views polarize over the conduct of security policy, the public 
is likely to follow, at least to a point. The public may not be the main 
wellspring of dissent in foreign and defense policy, but neither is it simply 
a passive observer. There are thresholds of public tolerance, and if these 
thresholds are crossed, issues can become salient enough to influence 
political choice. Even foreign and security policy can thus influence voting 
patterns for more than small groups of people, as we witnessed in the J une 
1983 British election. 
As yet we do not know precisely what causes this to happen, and the 
record shows that during the post-war period it is not a frequent occur-
rence. But in principle it applies equally to those formulating policy and 
those protesting policy. Those who seek to justify policy decisions and to 
discount the arguments of protesters risk losing public support as quickly 
as their opponents if they portray policy requirements in terms which fall 
outside the framework of public acceptance. Thus, just as it is important 
not to exaggerate the impact of protest on the public at !arge, so it is 
critical to avoid taking Western populations for granted. 
A considerable number of good reasons for this are to be found in the 
earlier description of the four clusters of attitudes. lt is impossible to say 
what it would take for any of these considerations to become salient 
enough to affect the behavior or choice of large segments of the popula-
tion. But clearly there are a number of demands populations are placing on 
Western security policy that if left unsatisfied have the potential for 
undermining the popular consensus that still does underpin Western 
Alliance arrangements. Above all, despite its general commitment to 
deterrence, defense and the Alliance, the public is demanding reassur-
ance-reassurance that Western policies designed to provide security are 
not also a primary source of insecurity. 
There are several guidelines for policy makers that flow from the 
analyses presented in this book that, if observed, will go a good distance 
toward providing the necessary reassurance. First of all, Western defense 
policy choices cannot be justified only or even primarily in terms of a 
Soviet threat. The reason is that peoples' perceptions of the Soviet Union 
do not appear to be the key to their perceptions of threat. Rather, the 
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relevance of growing Soviet military power and of the political benefits 
that are to grow from it must be explained differently if people are to 
accept that they have a military security problem. In the absence of this, 
portraying a Soviet threat in terms that are not perceived by the public is 
not likely to alter their perception of that threat nor increase support for 
Western policy, and is likely to have the opposite consequences. As long as 
the Soviets are not the primary security concern of populations at large, it 
will in fact continue to be possible for Western policies to scare our 
populations more than the Soviets do. 
Moreover, it is going to be virtually impossible to override these 
considerations by mobilizing rank and file support. In earlier periods, 
doubts about policy could be compensated for as long as adherence to the 
party line could be commanded on the basis of internal political consider-
ations. But the old link between policy toward the Soviets and domestic 
political preferences has been broken. As a consequence, invoking images 
of either nirvana or the evil empire are likely to be counterproductive. 
Given the widely perceived excess of military power in the world, 
support for many elements of Western defense policy will remain prob-
lematic unless policy makers are more skilled at demonstrating not only 
the relevance of growing Soviet military power but that additional West-
ern arms will help to preserve peace. Above all, military competition 
between East and West cannot be presented as an open-ended proposition. 
Support for the maintenance of a balance of power, which does exist in the 
abstract, will only be present to the extent that efforts to control military 
confrontation are plausible. 
Regarding nuclear weapons, populations are unlikely to force NATO 
governments to try to escape from the dilemmas of deterrence. But they 
will have to be convinced that everything is being done to minimize the 
likelihood of deterrence failing if this issue is not to grow in importance. 
They currently are not convinced of this. Moreover, the fastest way to 
increase nuclear rejection will be to ignore that nuclear strategy poses 
simultaneously major operational and existential issues. If governments 
focus only on the former, they will leave the moral high ground to those 
who would wish away the dilemmas of the nuclear age. 
Fourth, evidence shows that the Atlantic Alliance is widely supported 
but that Alliance policies will be supported by public opinion only if they 
are regarded as basically defensive. This image has suffered recently, 
particularly with the harder line American rhetoric that came with the 
Reagan administration, and is at variance with many Europeans' images of 
the purposes of the Alliance. There are those who argue that this was only 
meant for internal U.S. consumption anyway, and that the hark has been 
harsher than the bite. However, words obviously do make a difference, 
and Western populations, Americans included, will continue to demand 
that policies be designed to shape a less dangerous long-term relationship 
between East and West. 
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Moreover, there is another lesson in the above: domestic politics cannot 
be separated from external policies in today's world, not just the reverse. 
The transmission of information and the conduct of intra-Allied debate 
over policy is less and less confined to diplomatic channels and communi-
cation among top political leaders. The speed with which information is 
available to all Western publics simultaneously creates new and more 
direct interactions between the different political cultures existing in 
Alliance member states. Leaders can no longer afford the luxury of 
statements for purely "domestic" consumption. Allied decision makers 
have yet to understand fully how this modifi.es their fl.exibility in conduct-
ing domestic debates and international negotiations. 
Fifth, there is a clear preference within most Western publics for arms 
control over armaments or new weapons. This does not mean that public 
opinion at large would be unwilling to tolerate increases of Western arms 
or new weapon systems in general. However, little such support survives if 
arms control is allowed to be considered a direct substitute for one's 
defense policy or if the obstacles to successful arms control agreements are 
seen as much on one's own side as on the other. Arms control and defense 
policy must be presented as two sides of the same coin, not as alternative 
policy tracks. Certain security objectives can only be achieved by control-
ling East-West military confrontation, others only by defense moderniza-
tion. Treating the two as trade-offs for one another simply widens the 
scope for political dispute and fragile consensus. 
Finally, Western security requirements must be publicly presented and 
legitimized in terms of their contribution to the preservation of peace. 
Only Western governments are to blame if those who protest current 
policies are successful in creating the image that they have a monopoly on 
the desire for peace. lt may well be true that "the first round of the war for 
peace will probably be won by those who think the balance of terror is less 
terrifying than an imbalance of terror" (The Economist 8 October 1983). 
But the task for governments will be to take some of the terror out of the 
balance. 
The catalogue of constraints on policy that stem from existing public 
attitudes is thus signifi.cant. One cannot guarantee that a failure to heed 
these guidelines will cause the popular consensus underpinning Alliance 
arrangements to disintegrate but the attitudes described appear firm 
enough to warrant attention. The constraint is more in the form of a 
requirement to avoid defining or pursuing Western policy in a way that 
serves to crystallize political dissent in these areas because the dissent is 
likely to find a positive resonance in the echo chamber of public opinion. 
At the same time, there clearly is leeway for decision makers in the area 
of public tolerance of new weapons and increases in Western military 
might. But the implementation of the December 1979 decision demon-
strates the limits to that leeway. In the absence of widespread enthusiasm 
for deployment, the idea that the West could threaten deployment of 
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weapons over four years ignored totally the differences between political 
and social systems in the East and the West. Without the enthusiasm, one 
ends up threatening Western populations more than the adversary. 
Whether the Alliance continues to be perceived as peaceful, whether it 
is perceived to give sufficient emphasis to controlling military competi-
tion, whether people are convinced that particular weapons systems are 
required and that it really is the other side that is to blame for Western 
responses---these all interact with one another. They determine the way 
essential elements of military strategy are understood by people and 
interpreted in internal political debates and in exchanges between partners 
of the Alliance. In order to secure consensus and majority acceptance of 
Allied policies security issues cannot be allowed to serve as crystallizing 
points for minority protest. To a considerable degree it has been elite 
failures that have turned these topics into a focus of such protest. Whether 
the currently available high level of popular consensus over national 
security issues at the mass level can be maintained in Western nations into 
the future will crucially depend upon the extent to which decision makers 
will be able to heed the constraints imposed upon them by the popular 
attitudes described at length in this book. 
